Abstract. Linear regression-based methods have been proposed as efficient means of characterising device leakage in the training phases of profiled side-channel attacks. Empirical comparisons between these and the 'classical' approach to template building have confirmed the reduction in profiling complexity to achieve the same attack-phase success, but have focused on a narrow range of leakage scenarios which are especially favourable to simple (i.e. efficiently estimated) model specifications. In this contribution we evaluate-from a theoretic perspective as much as possible-the performance of linear regression-based templating in a variety of realistic leakage scenarios as the complexity of the model specification varies. We are particularly interested in complexity tradeoffs between the number of training samples needed for profiling and the number of attack samples needed for successful DPA: over-simplified models will be cheaper to estimate but DPA using such a degraded model will require more data to recover the key. However, they can still offer substantial improvements over non-profiling strategies relying on the Hamming weight power model, and so represent a meaningful middleground between 'no' prior information and 'full' prior information.
Introduction
Attackers with the opportunity to profile an identical copy of a target device in a preliminary training phase are considered the strongest class of side-channel adversary. Many different strategies have been implemented-some (but not all) are multivariate, incorporating multiple points from a measurement trace; some characterise only the deterministic data-dependent leakage whilst others attempt to characterise the noise also; profiling may be followed by a DPA-style attack phase, but need not be if the attacker has some other strategy in mind. Historically, the phrase 'template attack' denoted the multivariate Gaussian model variant with full noise characterisation [4]-regarded as the most powerful but also the most impractical method. Unsurprisingly, univariate attacks are much more feasible, and various simplifications make for relatively efficient template building [7] . One particularly interesting option for simplified profiling is to use linear regression [11] . Of course, as soon as more than one profiling method exists the natural question to ask is which is 'better' in practice? Previous studies evaluating linear regression relative to 'classical' templates [5, 11, 13] have demonstrated substantial efficiency gains in some typical leakage scenarios.
However, this previous work has some limitations. To begin with, comparisons have been predominantly experimental, and performed for devices conforming to Hamming weight (or otherwise close-to-linear) leakage assumptions. Such scenarios naturally favour linear regression from the outset, as the leakage functions may be approximated by very simple model equations (with few parameters and therefore low estimation complexity). Moreover, the comparisons have all been between simple linear regression equations (i.e. low degree polynomials) for intermediate values on the one hand and 'classical' templates for the inputs on the other. These are at opposite ends of a spectrum-'very simple' through to 'very complex' model specifications-leaving the middle ground largely unexplored. Hence we seek to evaluate a wider range of model specifications, in a broader, more varied, set of realistic leakage scenarios.
In an attempt to make unambiguous, like-for-like comparisons, which are not dependent on the estimation procedures used nor on the unknown underlying distributions arising in experimental scenarios, we follow the theoretic approach advocated in [15] in the context of non-profiled DPA. Namely, our analytic approach is (as far as possible) based on computed theoretic outcomes rather than estimated experimental outcomes, which entails focusing on fully-specified hypothetical leakage scenarios. We identify three key questions of interest:
1. How accurately does a particular model specification approximate the leakage function? For example, how well can an adversary hope to approximate a highly nonlinear function with a low-complexity model? The asymptotic goodness-of-fit of a model indicates its usefulness in DPA. 2. How many training samples are required in the profiling phase to estimate a particular model to an adequate degree of precision (relative to its asymptotic fit)? 3. How well does correlation DPA perform using a model built to a particular specification? Of most interest to an attacker or a designer/evaluator is the number of trace measurements needed for successful key recovery against the same or a sufficiently similar device.
In the following, we introduce 'classical' templates and the linear regressionbased alternatives in Sect. 2 and present our evaluation methodology in Sect. 3. We apply this methodology to a variety of realistic leakage scenarios and model specifications in Sect. 4. We confront our theoretic expectations with some example experimental analysis in Sect. 5, and conclude in Sect. 6.
